Expertise in Aviation by Wickens, Christopher D. & Dehais, Frédéric
	
				
		
		
	

	
 	  
 		 
	  	     	 	
		 	
		
			
	
	
	 




 
an author's https://oatao.univ-toulouse.fr/23798
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198795872.013.2
Wickens, Christopher D. and Dehais, Frédéric Expertise in Aviation. (2019) In: The Oxford Handbook of Expertise.
Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198795872
 Expertise in Aviation 
 
Christopher D. Wickens1 and Frederic Dehais2. 
 
1Department of Psychology, Colorado State University, Boulder CO, USA  
 
2ISAE-SUPAERO, Université de Toulouse, 10 avenue Edouard Belin, 
Toulouse, France. 
 
 
Keywords: Aviation, air traffic control, expertise, decision making, 
situation awareness, task management, visual scanning, cognitive abilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Introduction 
In 2009, Captain Chelsey “Sully” Sullenberg landed a crippled aircraft, 
loaded with 150 passengers and no power following a bird strike, on the Hudson 
River in New York. The incredible skill shown by Captain Sullenberg and his co-
pilot Jeffrey Skyles was credited with saving the lives of all on board in what 
could have been a near total disaster. Other examples of skilled piloting saving 
lives abound, including the landing of another totally crippled airline with no 
steering capability on the runway at Sioux Falls Iowa. Here, because the runway 
surface is far less forgiving than a river surface, many lives were lost; but equally 
many were saved. Again, the incredible skill and expertise of the pilot, Captain 
Hanes, and his crew were credited for this disaster management.  
These two disaster management responses reveal many different aspects 
of aviation expertise. Certainly, the finely tuned stick and rudder flying skills of 
Captain Sullenberg, reflecting his perceptual-motor coordination skill, permitted 
him to maintain a dangerously unstable aircraft on its critical glide slope to hit the 
water at precisely the correct angle and at high speed, so that its nose or wings did 
not penetrate the water and invite a catastrophic upset. For Captain Hanes, his 
calm communications skills, ability to harness all the resources of both his cabin 
crew,  an extra skilled pilot on board, and the services of air traffic control were 
all critical in accomplishing the life-saving actions. These factors combine as a set 
of skills known as crew resource management, which were first documented in 
 the social psychology literature (Foushee, 1984; Salas, 2010).  In between these 
skills supporting two disparate research areas in applied psychology (i.e., 
perceptual-motor coordination and social psychology), lies the expert decision 
making skills of pilots, exhibited  in the examples above in the choice of how and 
where to land. 
In this chapter, we will describe the nature of expertise in aviation, both on 
the flight deck and also in air traffic control (we here define both as aviation 
professional). We investigate what changes occur in these professionals with 
learning, and how an expert differs from a novice. In doing so, we first define 
what we mean by expertise in aviation, considering two alternative approaches: 
the amount of flight experience and the level of proficiency.  Next, we provide a 
clear description of the different psychological skills required of the aviation 
professional and their relationship to more fundamental information processing 
abilities. Then we review the research that has distinguished between levels of 
proficiency, typically novice from expert aviation professionals, or has evaluated 
the change  in skill differences as learning takes place. Finally, we briefly 
describe research that has tried to adopt novel training strategies to accelerate the 
trajectory of skill development.  
Defining Expertise  
There is an important distinction between the two different ways in which 
expertise has been defined in aviation. On the one hand, it is easy to define  
  
expertise a-priori, in terms of the amount of flight experience. This is typically 
characterized by the total number of hours spent piloting an aircraft (henceforth, 
flight hours). In some cases, the number of flight hours in visual flight (i.e., when 
the ground is in sight, (visual meteorological conditions or VMC) is differentiated 
from those spent in instrument flight conditions (Instrument meteorological 
conditions or IMC; i.e., when it is not and the pilot must rely totally on 
navigational instruments). These two conditions are the basis for two types of 
pilot ratings or certifications. With only a visual flight rating (or VFR), the pilot 
cannot fly in IMC (Instrument Meteorological Condition). With an instrument 
flight rating, (IFR), the pilot can fly in both VMC  and IMC, and is considered 
more proficient. Finally, sometimes, experience is also defined in terms of flight 
qualifications. In particular, those qualified to fly only general aviation are 
considered less proficient than those also certified to fly commercial transport 
aircraft, as run by the airline industry. 
The second distinction of aviation professional expertise, is simply how 
proficient the professional is at his or her task. Although we could credit the 
proficient management of individual incidents (such as those described at the 
outset), as being representative of an expert level of proficiency, we cannot 
necessarily say that this was a consequence of their many hours of both 
instrument and visual flight, nor whether these efforts would be repeatable and, 
therefore, truly expert. Indeed, National Transportation and Safety Board accident 
 reports are replete with similar examples but of tragic accidents, attributable to the 
errors of pilots who had many years of experience, such as the crash of an Eastern 
Airlines Jet into the Everglades (Wiener, 1977; Dismukes Berman & Nowinski, 
2011). As is true in many other domains, years of experience does not guarantee a 
high level of proficiency (Ericsson & Charness, 1997), particularly with a skill as 
critically dependent on fluent decision making as is the case with aviation. As has 
been previously noted, decision making is a task that is often ill suited for 
learning from experience (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978). 
 
Aviation Tasks 
The Pilot’s Tasks.  
Conventionally, the work of a pilot has been categorized into four tasks 
considered primary: 
1. Aviate. This is the standard perceptual-motor stick and rudder task 
required to keep the plane airborne. It involves selecting the right combination of 
airspeed via the throttle, pitch (nose pointed upward or downward) via controls 
on the wings and the elevator on the tail, and bank angle via the ailerons located 
on the wings so that the air flow is greater over the wings than beneath them. This 
differential flow in turn creates a partial vacuum above the wings, which literally 
lifts the aircraft upward toward the sky. There is greater lift when the aircraft if 
 flying faster through the air, and when the wings are level. When this lift is lost, 
the plane will stall and start to fall toward the earth. In addition to maintaining lift 
(and preventing stall), these controls with the stick and throttle serve to change the 
aircraft’s attitude (bank and pitch) in a way that can direct it to different vectors 
or 3D trajectories through the air (e.g., turn, climb, descend, accelerate or 
decelerate). These changes in turn are the basic building blocks of navigation as 
described below. 
What makes aviating so complex, and requires a great amount of skill 
development is the fact that all of these axes are cross-coupled (i.e., each action 
has both primary and secondary effects).  For example, when a pilot banks to turn 
the plane, it can also start to slide downward, hence both losing altitude and 
gaining airspeed. And when the pilot pitches the airplane upward to climb, it will 
also lose airspeed. Such cross coupling of primary and secondary effects requires 
a great deal of mental integration. Also, with larger aircraft, there is a greater lag 
between when a control is implemented, and when the plane starts to change the 
controlled variable. The dynamics of manual control systems are such that dealing 
with lags requires mental prediction which is cognitively quite demanding 
(Wickens & Gopher, 1977; Wickens, 1986; 2003; 2007). Failure to aviate well is 
often a precursor to a loss of control (LOC) accident--the most lethal kind of 
accident in both commercial and general aviation. Failure to properly aviate has 
 been identified as the causal factor for half the accidents of general aviation pilots 
in the UK during a 6-year period (Taylor, 2014). 
 2. Navigate. While, aviating can put the plane on a trajectory to establish 
where is it going, navigating determines the precise trajectory (e.g., a climb to 
5000 feet, a heading of 270 degrees) and precise targets (e.g., a fix over a certain 
point on the ground, at a particular altitude, at a point in particular time). Airborne 
navigation can be particularly challenging because of the number of attributes to 
be controlled (heading, climb, altitude, position, speed in four dimensions), and 
targets may be specified in various frames of reference (Wickens, 1999; Wickens 
Vincow & Yeh, 2005). For example, a navigational command may be given in a 
world-referenced frame (fly 250 degrees), but exercising it may require thinking 
in ego-referenced terms (I must turn 40 degrees from my current heading). The 
cognitive demands of transforming between different frames of reference (mental 
rotation) are familiar any time we are driving southward, negotiating complex 
intersections, while consulting a north-up map (Aretz & Wickens, 1992; Wickens, 
1999; Wickens et al., 2005). These complexities are amplified in 3 dimensions.   
 The close relationship between aviating and navigating has been described 
as a form of mental calculus—every bit as challenging as learning to intuitively 
apply integral and differential calculus computations(!!)—because the parameters 
controlled in aviating are generally integrated over time to establish the 
navigational goals (Wickens, 2007).  One should note that both of these tasks 
 (aviate and navigate) are, in many aircraft, supported by various forms of 
automation and technology. Autopilots can relieve the pilot of many aspects of 
aviating. Likewise, new navigational systems and some advanced displays can 
alleviate many of the mental transformations of navigating. However, such 
systems are always susceptible to failure, and it seems reasonable to assume that 
pilot skills at flying the aircraft by hand should always be practiced. Also training 
a pilot to fly should always proceed through the sequence of hand flying, before 
learning the capabilities of automation. 
 3. Communications. This refers primarily to voice communications 
between the pilot and air traffic control (Mosier et al., 2013). Verbal protocols—
precise readback of controller’s instructions and precise hearbacks by the 
controller (who must assure that the pilot reads back precisely what the controller 
said)—must  be maintained during their communications. This activity also 
requires tuning of the radios to different frequency channels, in order to deal with 
different controllers along the flight path. The challenge of precise 
communications is amplified by two factors. First, so much of it is accomplished 
by voice, and the auditory modality which is so susceptible to short term memory 
forgetting (Latorella, 1996, Helleberg & Wickens, 2003, Gateau, Durantin, 
Lancelot, Scannella & Dehais, 2015, Gateau, Ayaz, Dehais, 2018). Second, much 
of it involves numbers, which, if confused, can have catastrophic consequences 
 (e.g., confusing or mis-remembering a heading, altitude and airspeed command of 
320, 25, 350 respectively, as, for example, 350, 25, 320). 
 4. Systems management. This refers to assuring the proper mechanical 
and electrical status of all on board systems, such as power, fuel, engine 
functioning, as well as assuring the correct functioning of navigation and aviating 
systems. Systems management primarily involves monitoring and awareness the 
system status, whereas the prior three tasks also require the performance of 
specific, and often skilled, actions. However, system management can also 
escalate rapidly into required diagnosis, which involve action-driven trouble-
shooting and systems corrections when things go wrong. 
5. Mission tasks.  In addition to the above primary tasks, many flights also 
require a mission oriented task. An aerial photographer must photograph, a fire 
tanker must drop its load of fire retardant precisely, and of course almost all 
military aircraft have a mission-critical combat objective. These are often added 
to the four requirements of basic flying. 
  Task hierarchy. The four primary tasks of Aviate, Navigate, 
Communicate, and Systems management (ANCS) are listed in the above order 
because it is generally considered that these tasks are hierarchical and pilots 
should adhere to this ordering of prioritization when tasks conflict. For instance, 
unless the pilot keeps the plane in the sky (aviate), he or she cannot accomplish 
any of the tasks below it in the hierarchy; and, for safety reasons, the pilot should 
 always know where the plane is travelling and where it is, regarding navigational 
goals and hazard avoidance, before engaging in communication or systems 
management. The ANCS hierarchy needs to be flexible because certain tasks may 
temporarily demand top priority (Schutte & Trujillo; 1996). These task 
management skills, referred to as cockpit task management (CTM; Funk, 1991), 
are in themselves complicated and constitute important features of expert piloting. 
We discuss these features of expert piloting below in the sections on Task 
Management and Expertise in Aviation. Next we discuss the tasks in which expert 
air traffic controllers engage.  
Air Traffic Controller Tasks.  
The controller can have a work environment that is in many ways every 
bit as demanding as that of the pilot; even as it contains only two, rather than five 
major task categories (Wickens, Mavor, & McGee, 1997). These tasks can be 
defined as: 
Maintaining separation. The number one safety priority of the controller 
is to keep planes from colliding, in the air, or on the airport surface. To ensure 
that this is the case requires that the controller keeps each aircraft outside of a 
protected zone around each other one, a sort of cylindrical hockey puck of a 
designated vertical and circular extent (this may vary in its size, depending on the 
region of the airspace). To accomplish this, controllers are required to have an 
extensive amount of 3D visualization skills, particularly those involving spatial 
 prediction. If one plane is flying toward another’s protected zone, a command 
issued to the pilot to avoid penetration must be issued well before the zone is 
penetrated. And such proactive control requires the skill of making predictions 
(Boudes & Cellier, 2000). 
 Maintaining flow. An individual plane does not require controllers to 
direct it from start to destination. However, in the commercial airspace it is 
necessary that controllers maintain the collective flow between airports. This 
means they must continually control departures and arrivals. The controllers 
maximize the efficiency of travel, and hence minimize delays by managing the 
fundamental components of navigation (speed, heading, and altitude) of an entire 
stream of aircraft. 
Efficiency goals, such as maintaining flow of air traffic, and safety goals, 
such as maintaining separation between aircraft are somewhat conflicting. In a 
busy airspace, efficiency can be preserved only by tightly packing planes 
together. This can occur only up to a limit where separation standards are not 
violated. But where that boundary is difficult to establish, the balance between 
these competing forces is a key characteristic of controller proficiency. Unlike the 
pilot’s clear definition of a task hierarchy, the relative priority for maintaining 
wide separation versus flow, is not as easily determined given its conflicting 
nature. 
  
 Communications. Communications is a task shared equally by pilots and 
controllers. Although it may be argued that since the controller is generally in 
charge of issuing voice instructions, comprehension skill demonstrated during this 
exchange is most vital for the pilot, who after all is doing the majority of 
listening. 
As in other societal-technical domains of high complexity such as medicine or 
power plant management, so the skills in aviation may be divided  into the so-
called “technical skills”, related specifically to the task of controlling the aircraft, 
and non-technical skills of a more generic nature.  
Cognitive or Non-Technical Skills.   
At a slightly different level of description from the aviation task-oriented 
skills above that are clearly articulated in pilot and controller training manuals are 
a set of what we define as cognitive, or non-technical skills that can often 
differentiate better from poorer performing aviation professionals. We discuss 
four of these fundamental skills as follows. 
Task management. We referred briefly to task management skills above 
in the context of the ANCS priority hierarchy on the flight deck of cockpit task 
management (Chao, Madhavan, & Funk, 1996). But good task management skills 
go beyond adhering to this hierarchy to include such skills as: 
• Effectively & flexibly moving a lower hierarchy task toward the top in 
case of an emergency (Schutte & Trujillo, 1996). For example, an engine 
  
overheat may suddenly bring systems management to a greater priority 
than navigating. 
• Switching with sufficient frequency between tasks to avoid some form of 
cognitive tunneling on a task deemed high priority (e.g., troubleshooting 
an engine failure), at the expense of other safety critical tasks (e.g., 
altitude or airspeed monitoring; Wickens & Alexander, 2009) 
• Resisting dealing with a low priority interruption while in the middle of 
performing a higher priority task (Latorella, 1996). 
• Remembering to return to a temporarily deferred task (Loukopolis, 
Dismukes, & Barshi, 2009). 
Failures of appropriate task management in any of the four types above 
have been attributed as the cause of aircraft and ATC mishaps (Loukopolous, 
Dismukes, & Barshi, 2009; Dismukes, Berman, & Nowinski & 2010; Wickens, 
2003). We examine below the extent to which these improve with expertise. 
 Decision making and diagnostic skills. Since the pioneering work of 
Jensen (1982) and Wiener (1977), aviation professionals have realized the 
vulnerability of pilot and controller performance to making inappropriate or non-
optimal decisions and judgments that lead to accidents. For every good decision 
in crisis, such as that made by Captain Sullenberger to try to land on the river, 
there are countless poor decisions. These include examples such as the decision of 
a pilot who is not instrument rated, to try to fly through bad weather (Wiggins & 
  
O’Hare, 1995) in order to reach a final destination at all costs. A study conducted 
by the French Safety Board revealed that such erroneous behavior (perseveration) 
was responsible for more than 40% fatalities in general aviation (see Dehais, 
Tessier, Christophe, & Reuzeau, 2010). This trend to persist in hazardous decision 
making also occurs in commercial aviation (Dehais et al., 2019). For instance, 
97% of all unstabilized approaches end up with a decision to land (Curtis & 
Smith, 2013). These typically lead to satisfactory outcomes (potentially via good 
luck), but are occasionally the source of tragic fatalities, such as the decision by a 
pilot to take off with ice remaining on the wings at Washington National Airport 
in 1987 (see Helmreich, 1997).  
The study of cognition, and decision making in particular, have provided a 
great deal of knowledge on how decision skills are learned (e.g., for reviews, see 
Hoffman, Ward, Feltovich, DiBello, Fiore, & Andrews, 2014;  Suss & Ward, 
2015) and it is often assumed that such skills will naturally develop with time on 
task or years of flight experience. Yet certain specific characteristics that we 
discuss below render the acquisition of skilled pilot judgment a slow and 
sometimes unreliable process. 
 Situation awareness. Numerous aviation accidents have been directly 
attributed to a loss of situation awareness (SA), where a pilot or controller fails to 
maintain the big picture of what is going on, fails to notice changes in the 
environment or to predict the implications of the evolving situation (Jones & 
  
Endsley, 1996; Durso & Alexander,2010, Hopkin, 1999; Wickens, 2002). SA (or 
its complement, the Loss of SA: LSA), can apply to almost any dynamic feature 
of the aerospace environment, including the awareness of: 
• Aircraft attitude (pitch and roll)  
• Navigational and geographical information 
• Personnel (e.g., “what is my captain doing/thinking?”). 
• System and automation state.  
Orthogonal to these four examples of dynamic processes to be aware of, 
lie three components or levels of SA (Endsley, 1995, 1999). 
1. Noticing that things have changed, a process heavily dependent on visual 
scanning (level 1 SA). 
2. Understanding the meaning of changes, a process heavily dependent on 
prior knowledge (level 2 SA). 
3. Predicting the implications of the change, a cognitive activity quite 
dependent on working memory, a process dependent upon both prior 
knowledge and working memory (level 3 SA). 
While these categories map onto the pilots’ task hierarchy, the skill of 
maintaining SA is thought to be more general than the particular knowledge and 
skill set associated with any one of the ANCS tasks. Effort has been invested in 
trying to assess and train SA skills that might benefit any and all of the above 
tasks. 
  Crew resource management. Some skills emerge uniquely in a team, 
whether between pilot and co-pilot on the flight deck, or between flight deck 
personnel and ATC or the cabin crew. These have been termed Crew resource 
management, which include communications skills. However, these go well 
beyond adhering to the strict communications protocols described above, to 
include effective communications in emergencies where there may be no 
protocol, and harnessing of effective teamwork strategies, including what has 
been described as team situation awareness (Stanton, 2018). As with the other 
non-technical skills described above, airspace incidents and accidents provide 
plentiful examples where CRM was both effective in saving the day (e.g., the 
Sioux City crash), or was found wanting, leading to confusion, uncertainty and, 
often disaster (e.g., the crash of a commercial airliner in the Florida Everglades, 
when all three personnel on the flight deck concentrated on a potential landing 
gear failure, and did not pay attention to alitude) (see O’Hare & Roscoe, 1993). 
Expertise in Aviation 
Taken together, both technical and non-technical skills define a powerful 
array, which should differentiate the expert and highly experienced pilot or 
controller from one who either has little experience or performs poorly at the task. 
But is this intuition correct? Below we review the experimental and descriptive 
data for the different categories of skills that indicate the extent to which these 
intuitions are correct, and the more specific features that differentiate levels of 
 expertise. To the extent that these skills do differentiate across levels of 
proficiency, we examine the success of training strategies targeted directly at the 
four non-technical skills, to establish if the trajectory of expertise can be 
shortened.  
In the following section we review the literature on professional aviation 
expertise. Our operational definition of expertise is high proficiency in 
performing aviation tasks. As such, proficiency may be assessed by instructor 
ratings, objective quality of performance on subtasks or often, as is the case 
particularly of pilot judgment, of decision outcomes that are either labeled good 
(e.g., turning back in deteriorating weather) or poor (e.g., flying on into a storm). 
At the extreme, mishaps and accidents are often the consequence of poor 
performance. Increasing expertise implies better outcomes, and the expert is one 
who consistently produces the best outcomes. 
Our review seeks to understand three main factors that may contribute to 
outcome quality: 
• Flight or ATC experience and certification or type ratings 
• Natural cognitive or psychomotor abilities.  These may sometimes extend 
to personality types or measures of cognitive style. 
• Certain cognitive strategies that are typically learned through aviation 
experience. Prominent among these which we will discuss are ocular-
motor or visual scanning strategies. 
  
The four main non-technical skills described above often  mediate the 
relationship between the three  main intervening variables and the outcome For 
example, an aviator may demonstrate good outcomes because she possesses 
superior situation awareness Trapsilawati., Wickens, Cheun & Qu, X. (2017) However 
we note that in many cases these non-technical skills represent the final outcome 
of aviation performance assessment. Finally, we consider two phenomena well 
known to develop with experience, whether through deliberate practice or simply 
on-the-job training (e.g., Patrick, 2006), the decreased attention demands of 
performance, known to occur with a phenomenon termed automaticity (e.g., Fisk 
Ackerman & Schneider, 1987), or an increase in knowledge (e.g.,  Simon & 
Gilmartin 1973). We refer to these two phenomena as the known signatures of 
expertise. 
 
The Research 
In the following pages we first discuss research supporting two of the most 
prominent features of expertise in general, automaticity and knowledge. We then 
consider the findings of general changes in performance that result as expertise 
develops before considering in depth, how these are expressed in the non-
technical skills of improved situation awareness, better decision making and 
improved task management and resource management skills. A final research 
section is devoted to explicit efforts to train these non-technical skills. 
  
Known Signatures of Expertise 
Automaticity and spare capacity. It has been long known that increasing 
practice on a task, whether deliberate, or just through repeated performance 
reduces the attention/resource demands of the task (Fitts & Posner, 1967). This is 
one feature of a characteristic we refer to as automaticity (Fisk Ackerman & 
Schneider, 1987;  Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). One consequence of automaticity 
is to make available attentional capacity for use on other tasks, which often results 
in improved time sharing. This phenomenon was well illustrated by Damos 
(1978) who demonstrated that flight instructors with greater flying experience 
performed better on a secondary task performance while flying than of student 
pilots (novices).  
There is also some evidence that individual differences in cognitive ability 
can play a role in making available spare attentional resources. In particular 
working memory (WM) span needed, for instance, in flight communications has 
been shown to vary broadly across people in general (e.g., Engle, 2002) and pilots 
specifically (e.g., Morrow et al, 2003). Hence those with greater WM span should 
demonstrate greater proficiency on other tasks while engaged in tasks that place a 
considerable demand on working memory. 
It is important to note however that individuals develop automaticity better 
on some tasks or, more specifically, some individuals develop automaticity better 
when learning under some conditions than others. In particular, classic work by 
 Schneider and Shiffrin (1977; Fisk Ackerman & Schneider, 1987) showed that 
only tasks for which there is high consistency between the mapping of events in 
the world and appropriate actions can develop total automaticity (and hence 
demand no resources). An example of such consistency is flight control without 
turbulence, in which a given action on the stick will be guaranteed to produce 
nearly the identical aircraft response every time given the same conditions (e.g., 
aircraft cargo weight and termperature/humidity/pressure)  and within the same 
aircraft dynamics type.  
However unlike flight control (the aviate tasks), many other aviation tasks 
do not provide the opportunity to acquire skills consistently, particularly many 
decision tasks; because the appropriate decision may depend heavily on the 
context or conditions in which the decision is required, which can vary markedly 
as would be expected in any complex domain. For example, the decision to fly on 
or turn back may depend not only on the weather, but also the fuel remaining or 
conditions at the different airports. Furthermore, appropriate decisions also 
depend on future conditions. Not only can information about the current situation 
be incomplete, future conditions are often imperfectly predictable, and hence 
provide an inconsistent context to which pilots must actively adapt (for a 
description of adaptive skill, see Ward, Gore, Hutton, Conway, & Hoffman, 
2018). In short, many aviation decisions simply cannot be automatized and will 
always be resource-demanding, independent of the level of pilot expertise. 
 Knowledge. Just as reduced resource demand in consistently mapped tasks 
is a signature of experience producing expertise, so also is the increase in 
knowledge about aviation. Such increase allows both more rapid and accurate 
retrieval of facts and procedures with experience. In air traffic control, the amount 
of time spent at a particular facility is one of the greatest predictors of expertise, 
allowing the controller to understand all the particular quirks and features of the 
relevant airspace (Seamster, Redding, & Kaempf, 1997; Wickens et al., 1997). 
Studies have revealed that not only does the amount of knowledge increase with 
experience, the qualitative nature of knowledge organization becomes more 
sophisticated (Schvanevelt, 1985; Sherry & Polson, 1999).  
 
Expertise in General Flight Performance  
Hardy and Parasuraman (1997) argued that domain independent 
knowledge (i.e., used in domain-general cognitive functioning) and pilot’s 
characteristics (i.e., domain-specific expertise) collectively determine general 
flight performance. Whereas most of the empirical studies report a close 
relationship between flight experience and basic flying skills, several cognitive 
ability factors have been inferred to mediate this relation such as time-sharing 
ability (Tsang & Shaner, 1995), speed of processing (Taylor et al., 1994), 
attention (Knapp & Johnson, 1996), and both psychomotor ability and general 
intelligence (g) (Caretta & Ree, 2003). Yakimovitch et al (1994) were among the 
  
very first to use a method to investigate these complex interactions between 
individual, expertise and flight performance. Their approach administered a 
battery of cognitive tests (e.g., Cogscreen-AE) and showed that it was predictive 
of flight parameter violation in real flight conditions. Following this approach of 
testing battery correlations with flight performance, Taylor and colleagues (2000) 
found that speed of processing, working memory, visual associative memory, 
motor coordination, and tracking abilities explained 45% of the variance of the 
flight simulator performance.  
More recent studies have been able to replicate and expand these findings 
regarding processing speed (Kennedy et al., 2013; Tolton, 2014; Van Benthem & 
Herdman, 2016), working memory (Causse, Dehais, Arexis, & Pastor, 2011; 
Causse, Dehais, & Pastor, 2010; Tolton, 2014; Van Benthem & Herdman, 2016), 
tracking ability (Tolton, 2014), as well as visual attention allocation, cognitive 
flexibility (Van Benthem & Herdman, 2016) and logical reasoning (Causse, 
Dehais & Pastor, 2010). These were all positively correlated with to the ability to 
maintain flightpath and keep control of the aircraft. 
 In contrast to the previous studies however, Causse, Dehais and Pastor 
(2010) did not report any relationship between basic reaction time speed and 
flight performance, a conclusion echoing that of Caretta and Ree (2003). In 
contrast, Johnston and Catano (2013), reported only limited success of cognitive 
ability tests to predict success in Canadian military aviation training. In reviewing 
  
pilot selection test batteries Damos (1996) concluded that, collectively, these 
results showed only a limited ability to predict expert flight performance. In sum, 
although some studies show a positive correlation between cognitive ability and 
expert performance, the correlations are low, although sometimes significant (p < 
.05) between r = .15 and r = .40 (see Causse, Matton, and Del Campo, 2012). We 
now turn to the sources of expertise in the four more specific non-technical tasks. 
Situation Awareness 
As we might expect, each level of SA (noticing, understanding and 
predicting) in experts depends on different types of skills and abilities (Sohn & 
Doane, 2004; Wickens, 2007). At level 1, as we describe in detail below, visual 
scanning strategies are a major component (Wickens McCarley et al., 2008). At 
level 2, knowledge is critical for understanding (Sohn & Doane, 2004). And at 
level 3, because of the critical cognitive demands of projecting, there is a vital 
role for working memory as well as knowledge. We now describe each of these 
levels in more detail. 
 Visual scanning and level 1 SA. The monitoring of the flight parameters 
on the flight deck is a key issue for flight safety. The National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)  
that deficiencies in monitoring were a causal factor in most of the major recent 
civilian accidents  (NTSB, 2013; UK Civilian Aviation Authority, 2013). Jones 
and Endsley (1996) determined that 755 of Air Force aircraft mishaps resulting 
 from LSA, resulted from the breakdown of level 1 SA. Indeed, the volume of 
information that needs to be dynamically processed can overwhelm human 
operators and lead too poor situation awareness with regards to primary flight 
parameters. Several eye tracking studies have revealed that more experienced 
pilots have developed specific scanning strategies, different from novices, to 
ensure better awareness and flying performance  (Kim, Palmisano, Ash, & 
Allison, 2010; Kirby, Kennedy, & Yang, 2014; Li, Chiu, & Wu, 2012; Ottati, 
Hickox, & Richter, 1999; Robinski & Stein, 2013). See also the comprehensive 
review of pilot scanning studies by Ziv (2017). As an example, a vast majority of 
studies revealed that experienced pilots exhibited shorter dwell times on the 
instrument displays but checked them more frequently (Bellenkes, Wickens, & 
Kramer, 1997; Kasarskis, Stehwien, Hickox, Aretz, & Wickens, 2001; Kramer, 
Tham, Konrad, Wickens, & Lintern, 1994; Li, Chiu, Kuo, & Wu, 2013; Sullivan, 
Yang, Day, & Kennedy, 2011; Tole, Stephens, Vivaudou, Ephrath, & Young, 
1983). These finding suggest that expertise is associated with more efficient 
visual scanning, that is, greater skill at extracting relevant information in a shorter 
amount of time.  
Some explanations may rely on the more experienced pilot’s qualitatively 
different visual search pattern than novices and the proficiency of expert’s mental 
model of their aircraft dynamics. For example, Bellenkes et al (1997) found that 
 more experienced pilots scanned predictive instruments more than novices, as if 
they were looking ahead of the aircraft. Wickens, McCarley et al. (2008) noted 
that those pilots who showed greater adherence to the prescriptions of an optimal 
priority-driven scan model were more proficient in detecting possible traffic 
conflicts, hence linking differences in level 1 SA to expertise in the navigational 
component (hazard avoidance) of pilot performance. Schriver, Morrow, Wickens, 
and Talleur (2008) found that more experienced pilots, during simulated in-flight 
failures, both made better decisions and spent more time fixating on more relevant 
instruments. Here there was a link between experience and expertise in decision 
making, mediated by level 1 SA. The scanning patterns of more experienced 
pilots has also been shown to be more robust and less affected by increased 
workload and stress (Tole et al., 1983) and also to be more flexible to adapt to 
contingencies (Bellenkes et al., 1997).  
Despite evidence that pilots improve their visual scanning with practice, 
some eye tracking studies have pointed out the importance of inter-individual 
differences with regard to visual abilities and level 1 situation awareness. For 
example, a study in a motion simulator revealed that dwell time on the landing 
gear indicator, but not flight experience, was predictive of the ability to detect an 
auditory landing gear alarm (Dehais et al., 2012, 2013). This study is in line with 
previous research demonstrating that the detection of unexpected events might be 
compromised by inadequate scanning and focused attention (Alexander & 
  
Wickens, 2006). Li, Chiu and Wu (2012) found that specific scanning strategies 
led pilots to have a better situation awareness of an hydraulic failure 
independently of the level of experience. Moreover, their study revealed that 
dwell time on relevant instruments such as airspeed strongly mediated experience 
to optimize fuel consumption and flight duration.  
Individual differences in scanning strategies have also been found to 
discriminate good versus poor flight performance during critical flight phases 
such as landing (Gray, Navia, & Allsop, 2014). Lefrancois, Matton, Gourinat, 
Peysakhovich, and Causse, (2016) found that pilots who had an inadequate dwell 
time on the attitude indicator were more likely to face an unstabilized approach 
and had to perform a go-around. Correspondingly, Reynal, Rister, Scannella, 
Wickens and Dehais (2017) observed that higher dwell time on the attitude 
indicator and lower fixation time on the navigation display was associated with 
poor awareness a destabilized approach and the resulting necessity to perform a 
go-around.  Regarding this latter flight phase, crews whom Pilot Monitoring spent 
more time glancing on the speed indicator exhibited better flightpath management 
(Dehais, Behrend, Peysakhovich, Causse, & Wickens, 2017).  
Our review failed to identify studies in air traffic control where individual 
differences in scanning strategies were specifically associated with performance 
differences. The only study located (Hasse, Grasshoff, & Bruder, 2012) revealed 
null results.  Part of the challenge here is the more ill-defined (compared to the 
 cockpit) designation of specific areas of interest at the controller work station for 
quantifying controller scanning. 
 Understanding and predicting: Levels 2 and 3 SA. In reviewing this 
literature, we combine research on levels 2 and 3 SA, because some researchers 
do not distinguish between them, and in any case, the borderline between what is 
happening (level 2) and what will happen (level 3) is a very fuzzy one. To 
illustrate, in a collision avoidance situation in which the pilot is in a state of 
predicted conflict (understanding current state), this state is indistinguishable from 
saying that the pilot will collide (prediction) (if a maneuver is not initiated). Sohn 
and Doane (2004) found that experience (flight hours) was a strong predictor of 
aircraft state awareness, a finding consistent with that of Bellenkes et al (1997) 
who examined the frequency of looking at predictive instruments. It certainly 
makes sense that greater experience provides better knowledge and a better 
mental model of flight dynamics, hence allowing the pilot to more easily seek and 
absorb incoming information from appropriate sources. Sohn and Doane also 
found that SA was higher for pilots who had higher visualization skills and a 
greater capacity of long term working memory (LTWM; Ericsson & Kintch, 
1995; see Chapter on The Classic Expertise Approach, Gobet, this volume). This 
latter construct—described as a retrieval structure-based mechanism that permits 
the limits of working memory to be circumvented—lies at the intersection of 
working memory and long term memory. Those who have developed LTWM 
  
skills have essentially developed the ability to rapidly access and retrieve material 
regarding changing state, even if that material is not being actively rehearsed. 
Sulistwawati, Wickens, and Poon (2011) observed that spatial ability and 
general working memory capacity predicted situation awareness in air force 
fighter pilots, and Caretta and Ree (1996) observed a corresponding correlation of 
working memory capacity with the situation awareness  of fighter pilots as rated 
by their superiors. Importantly, Caretta and Ree found that psychomotor 
performance and personality tests did not predict higher rated SA for their 
military sample. 
 Of the above studies, Sulityawati et al. explicitly distinguished predictors 
of level 2 from level 3 SA, observing that only level 3 expertise was uniquely 
predicted by reasoning and logic ability. Furthermore they found that pilots with 
high level 3, performed better in simulated air to air combat scenarios, but level 2 
SA was not a significant predictor of performance here. Endsley and Bolstadt 
(1994) found that Levels 2 and 3 SA of fighter pilots correlated with spatial skills, 
perceptual speed and pattern matching ability. 
In air traffic control, Durso, Blekely, and Gronland (1996) examined the 
speed and accuracy of simulated traffic management. The better performing 
novices (i.e., those developing greater expertise) showed higher cognitive abilities 
of spatial working memory, perceptual closure and need for cognition. 
Furthermore a test of controller SA developed by the authors added to the 
 prediction of performance above and beyond those cognitive abilities. Unlike 
Sohn and Doane (2004), their  test was not explicitly designed to test LTWM 
theory (as with Sohn & Doane, 2004), but the authors drew similar conclusions. 
In conclusion, increases in memory capacity, both working memory and 
LTWM are associated with higher situation awareness. In the case of LTWM, this 
is consistent with the findings that experts in other domains possess greater 
LTWM skills (e.g., see Suss & Ward, 2015, 2018; Ward et al., 2013). In at least 
one study, higher SA was found to be directly associated with increased aviation 
flight performance. 
Decision and Judgment 
Good aviation judgment depends on good situation awareness but is 
distinct from it in its focus on the specific choice or action to be generated and 
then taken on the basis of a dynamic situation assessment. Ward et al. (2013) 
referred to decision making and the situation assessment process (i.e., 
sensemaking) as two reciprocal sides of the same dynamic system (e.g., Neisser, 
1976; for a model of how these two processes work collectively to bring about 
adaptive performance, also see Ward et al., 2018). Hence, we might expect the 
quality of aviation decision making to be driven by some but not all of the factors 
that drive SA. We might  also expect that decision making is driven by factors 
that are uniquely related to the choice process; such as generating options for 
action, based on past experience. 
  
Experimental studies of expertise in pilot judgment and decision making 
have generally taken two forms: Discriminating those who make good decisions 
from those who make poor decisions in a particular context (such as the poor 
decision to continue the flight in poor weather), or assessing the characteristics of 
good pilot judgment in general (rather than in a particular context). In the former 
case, we assume that greater expertise is associated with those who make the 
better decision.   
Good vs poor decisions. Several investigations have looked specifically at 
the tendency to make a poor judgment and fly on into deteriorating weather 
conditions, when the better choice is to turn back given the pilot’s lack of 
qualifications. Several studies have indeed found that greater experience (i.e., 
more flight hours) supports better decision making in this context (Goh & 
Wiegmann, 2001; Hunter, Martinussen, Wiggins, & O’Hare, 2011; Wiggins & 
O’Hare, 1995; 2003; Wiegmann, Goh, & OHare 2002; Johnson & Wiegmann, 
2015). However,  Wiggins and Bollwert (2006) found better decision making to 
be more highly correlated with recency in flight experience (i.e., last 60 days) 
than with overall flight hours. A major reason why experience provided an 
advantage is that those with more experience tend to employ the strategies of 
seeking and interpreting cues in the weather environment. These cognitive 
activities (seeking, interpreting) are closely related to, if not the same as, the 
expert’s advantage in level 1 and 2 SA, respectively.  
 Johnson and Wiegmann (2013) qualified that it was not purely the amount 
of flight hours that distinguished expert pilots making good decisions from those 
at a lower level of proficiency making poorer decisions. Rather it was the amount 
of time actually flying in poor weather that predicted decision quality. This 
implies a note of caution in simply using overall hours as a proxy for experience. 
Goh and Wiegmann (2001) observed that those who chose to continue flight when 
it was inappropriate to do so provided higher ratings of their own skills and 
judgments; a finding that might implicate a greater degree of overconfidence. We 
note however, that none of the researchers from this class of studies examined the 
influence of individual differences in, for instance, cognitive ability on judgment 
and decision making. 
To complement research on the decision to fly on into bad weather, a 
second type of research discriminating good from poor choices has examined the 
choice to continue with a landing under ill-advised circumstances. Several 
behaviors describe the kind of factors that help avoid such poor decision making. 
For instance, as described earlier, those who did not choose to continue under 
sub-optimal conditions (i.e., chose to go-around), employed more efficient 
scanning strategies (e.g., higher number of and shorter fixations on information 
that permitted insight in to upcoming events; see Reynal et al., 2017) . Good 
decision makers had higher working memory capacity and greater attentional 
flexibility (Causse et al., 2011a), were better at risk assessment (Hunter et al., 
 2011), and exhibited lower impulsivity (Causse et al, 2011b, Behrend, Dehais, 
Koechlin, 2017). Subsequent research has also shown that when monetary 
incentive and uncertainty were manipulated in the helicopter landing decision 
task, risky decision makers exhibited lower activation of the prefrontal areas (i.e., 
dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex) than good decision 
makers. These areas signify rationality (Causse et al., 2013). In a related study, 
Adamson et al. (2014) found that lower activity in the caudate nucleus was 
associated with higher landing decision accuracy in instrument meteorological 
condition. Unfortunately, however, how these differences are moderated by 
individual differences in expertise remains relatively unchartered, specifically 
when examining performance on an aviation task (cf. Hunter et al., 2011). 
Further, none of the studies of landing decisions appear to have associated 
decision quality with the differences in experience (e.g., number of flight hours). 
 Overall decision quality. The more general approach to measuring 
expertise in pilot decision making, going beyond a particular decision (e.g., to 
land or go-around) is illustrated by two classes of studies. As an example of the 
first type, Stokes and his colleagues developed a pilot judgment trainer/evaluator 
simulator called MIDIS, which presented various decision scenarios to pilots and 
emplyed skilled flight instructors to evaluate their choices of action in terms of 
decision quality (Barnett et al.,1987; Stokes, Kemper, & Marsh, 1988; Stokes et 
al., 1987; Wickens, Stokes, Barnett, & Hyman, 1993). Barnett et al., (1987) 
 observed that within a cohort of more experienced pilots, better decisions were 
made by those with higher working memory capacity. Likewise, Stokes et al. 
(1988) found that experts generally made more optimal choices; for example 
turning back when it was appropriate to do so.  Results from the other two MIDIS 
studies in which pilots with different levels of experience (i.e. more vs. less flight 
time) were compared either found no difference in decision quality between 
groups, or ambiguous results (i.e., differences on some metrics but not other; 
Stokes et al., 1987).   
As noted above, Schriver et al. (2008) examined experience differences in 
pilot decision making following in-flight failures in a simulator, a skill heavily 
dependent upon diagnostic ability and cue seeking.  As a consequence of seeking 
different cues  (e.g., oil pressure indicator, airspeed) by those at a lower level of 
proficiency, more experienced pilots’ decisions were superior in both speed and 
accuracy. 
The second type of general  decision quality study has examined non-
experimental aspects of data. Rebok et al (2005) studied a large number of 
violations by air taxi pilots, where a violation was defined as an intentional 
decision to not follow or deviate from aviation rules. The authors found that fewer 
violations (i.e., bad decisions) were committed by pilots with more than 5000 
flying hours. However among this group, there was no tendency for violation rate 
to decrease with additional flight experience.  
 In a related study, Hunter (2006) measured pilots’ perception of perceived 
risk of different flight scenarios, as a function of their flight certification category, 
and observed that pilots in more advanced categories (e.g., transport pilots) who 
were, therefore, more experienced, generally perceived lower risk.  It is not clear 
whether such pilots simply have greater confidence in their judgment because of 
greater proficiency, or rather, perhaps have greater overconfidence in their 
abilities. This finding potentially echoes that of Goh and Wiegmann (2001) and is 
consistent with other decision making research, which suggests that that higher 
levels of decision making experience often fosters increasing levels of 
overconfidence (Kahneman, 2011; Wickens Hollands et al., 2013). 
Finally a pessimistic view of the relationship between experience and judgment 
quality was offered by the data of McKinney (1993) who examined the quality of 
professional’s decision outcomes.  Professional fighter pilots’  quality of decision 
making following Air Force aircraft mishaps was analyzed by two experienced 
pilots.. No differences in quality were observed as a function of years of 
experience. Furthermore, McKinneys data revealed that those pilots flying in the 
leadership position exhibited poorer quality decisions, a finding McKinney 
attributes in part to greater overconfidence of those leads and partly to their lack 
of habit of soliciting information from others. 
The absence of an experience effect is consistent with two other 
observations made by decision scientists on the effects of experience on decision 
 making in other contexts.. Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) have identified relatively 
poor learning (i.e., limited improvement with experience) with respect to their 
decision making because the feedback is often delayed. Feedback in many real 
world contexts is often misleading in an uncertain world because poor decision 
sometimes produce (luckily) good outcomes, and vice versa (i.e., good decisions 
can have poor effects). Following the earlier research of Shanteau (1993), 
Kahneman (2011; Kahneman & Klein, 2014) examined the characteristics of 
professions in which experience does not produce expertise in (i.e., better) 
decision making and judgment and argued that the unpredictable aspects of such 
environments, and the resulting limited or challenging opportunities to learn from 
feedback, are primary reasons for this disconnect (for similar effects in healthcare, 
see Ericsson 2004; Ericsson, Whyte, & Ward, 2007). Given the complexities of 
many aviation environments, it is understandable that this environment may, 
sometimes, result in only a loose association between expertise and experience. 
 As reviewed above few researchers have directly examined these kinds of 
decisions as a function of cognitive ability differences. Those that have, have 
observed that any such differences are not reliably predictive of the choices made 
by pilots. The ability to predict expertise in decision making on the basis of 
experience appears to grow increasingly problematic as we move from specific 
in-context decisions (e.g., flying through bad weather, inappropriate landings, or 
inaccurate diagnosis of system failures) to more generic context-independent 
 evaluations of the process. The effect of experience therefore appears to be to 
support seeking out relevant perceptual cues (e.g., Schriver et al., 2008), not 
necessarily a reliance on superior capacities. 
Cockpit Task Management.  
Surprisingly little research has been carried out on experience and 
expertise in aviation cockpit task management (Loukopolis et al., 2009; Chao, 
Madhavan, & Funk, 2003). The focus of this research is distinct from scanning, in 
that it defines how one switches attentional resources between tasks, rather than 
how the eyeball switches between sources of information. It is distinctive from 
much attention research in that it examines attention’s sequential, rather than its 
parallel properties (Wickens, Gutwiller, & Santamaria, 2015).  In one study 
Wickens and Raby (1995) imposed sudden high workload on advanced student 
pilots doing a landing approach. The distinguishing feature of expertise between 
those performing best (in terms of flight path deviations) and those performing 
worst was that the former group scheduled higher priority tasks at more 
appropriate or optimal times. Similar findings in a flight simulator study were 
reported by Laudemann and Palmer (1995). Neither study however examined 
differences in experience, nor correlated task management strategies with 
individual differences in cognitive ability.  
Although basic research has correlated differences in basic attentional 
functioning with attention management strategies in multi-tasking environments, 
 this has not been done in an aviation context, let alone with consideration of level 
of proficiency in this domain. Future aviation expertise research should examine 
this issue further.  
Crew Resource Management. 
Crew resource management, defines the coordination among teams (pilot, 
copilot, ATC) in, typically, dealing with in-flight emergencies or unpredicted 
events. While crew experience and CRM are beyond the scope of the current 
chapter (see Salas et al., 2010), one study of voice communications is directly 
relevant to both the non-technical skill of CRM and to the fourth task on the 
pilots’ ANCS hierarchy: Communications. In this study, Morrow et al. (2003) 
found that experienced pilots showed better recall of typical ATC 
communications information than did non-pilots. However, there was little 
evidence that within the pilot population, increasing experience led to better 
recall. But for all groups, superior performance on communications recall was, 
expectedly, associated with greater working memory capacity and greater spatial 
ability. The latter benefit can be attributed to the fact that although numerical 
symbolic information was communicated, its interpretation was in terms of spatial 
locations and trajectories within the 3D airspace. 
Training and creating expertise in non-technical aviation skills.  
If experts perform better than novices in non-technical skills, an important 
issue is whether there are particular training modules available in these skills to 
 shortcut the trajectory from novice to expert aviation professional. We examine 
whether their application has documented any success via positive transfer to 
more in-context aviation tasks. Here the evidence is scant and mixed. Regarding 
crew resource management, a host of CRM training programs have been adopted 
by nearly all of the American and European airlines; but a meta-analysis by Salas 
et al. (2006), concluded little consistent evidence for positive transfer. Regarding 
cockpit task management, Gopher and his colleagues have demonstrated some 
success of using the Space–Fortress multi-task video game to develop attention 
management skills that appeared to improve the chances of Israeli Air Force pilots 
to become qualified for the highest proficiency fighter pilot slots. Regarding 
decision making, other researchers (e.g., Walmsley & Gilbey, 2017) have 
developed specific aviation decision training modules (e.g., MIDIS: Stokes et al., 
1988), but these have not been documented to transfer to better decision making 
in more remote contexts beyond the MIDIS simulator itself.  
Regarding situation awareness, Endsley and Robertson, (2000) and 
(Endsley, & Garland, 2000) have discussed the need for such training but very 
few studies have proposed and evaluated indirect training for this important non-
technical skill. For example, two PC-based situation awareness training programs 
were respectively implemented for navy cadets (Strater et al., 2004) and general 
aviation pilots (Bolstad, Endsley, Costello, & Howell, 2010). These studies failed 
to report strong evidences of situation awareness improvement. Only two 
 situation awareness modules programs were developed for airlines pilots 
(Hoermann, 2003) and airline student pilots (Gayraud, Matton, & Tricot 2017). 
The results of these two studies disclosed better performance and situation 
awareness scores for the experimental versus the control group when confronted 
with scenarios in simulated flights. The findings of these studies should encourage 
more research to define and test training solutions to enhance situation awareness 
ability and other non-technical aviation skills such as scanning as a means to 
potentially accelerate the acquisition of expertise. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion expertise in aviation is certainly multi-dimensional, a 
complex mix of experience, abilities and strategies, and this situation reflects the 
complex mix of technical and non-technical skills required. It is important to note 
too that within the field, there is not the same sort of competition to identify the 
best pilot that exists in other domains of performance (the exception being 
competition in university aviation flight teams). Although military aviation 
training and selection does sometimes refer to those selected to be fighter pilots as 
“the elite”, it is hardly fair to characterize them, as a class, as experts because 
their skills for high proficiency may be quite different from those demanded by 
the transport pilot, or helicopter pilot. 
A further challenge for defining expertise in aviation arises from the 
emerging dominance of flight deck automation. This tends to level the playing 
 field of flying skills, except on those rare and unexpected occasions when 
automation fails (Wickens, 2009) and here, the better performing pilot or 
controller (i.e., the expert) may, ironically, be the one who has greater proficiency 
performing without automation, so that graceful recovery can be accomplished. 
Ultimately one can argue that what truly defines expertise in aviation is 
the guarantee of safety. But this is an exceedingly difficult commodity to assess; 
perhaps defined by wise decisions to avoid unsafe conditions and possessing the 
non-technical skills to escape those conditions should they unexpectedly be thrust 
on the pilot. But experience in making the former decision, as we saw, does not 
necessarily lead to competence, and the occurrence of the latter decision is, 
fortunately, quite rare but hence hard to reliably assess. 
Hence, we see a strong need for research to continue to examine these 
differences in expertise defined by aviation proficiency, where and however they 
can be found, and correlate them with abilities, strategies (i.e., maintaining SA, 
scanning) and, indeed experience, to continue compiling these in a systematic 
way. We hope that this chapter has provided a foundation for this effort. 
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